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N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980)
100 S.Ct. 856, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2526, 63 L.Ed.2d 115, 87 Lab.Cas. P 11,819

even independently of established employer
policy and must be aligned with management,
and normally, an employee may be excluded as
managerial only if he represents management
interests by taking or recommending
discretionary actions that effectively control or
implement employer policy. National Labor
Relations Act, §§ 1 et seq., 2(3, 11), 14(a) as
amended 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et seq., 152(3, 11),
164(a).

100 S.Ct. 856
Supreme Court of the United States
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Petitioner,
v.
YESHIVA UNIVERSITY.
YESHIVA UNIVERSITY FACULTY
ASSOCIATION, Petitioner,
v.
YESHIVA UNIVERSITY.

98 Cases that cite this headnote

Nos. 78–857, 78–997. | Argued Oct. 10, 1979. |
Decided Feb. 20, 1980.
2
On petition for enforcement of an order of the National
Labor Relations Board, the Court of Appeals, Mulligan,
Circuit Judge, 582 F.2d 686, denied petition, and
certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Mr. Justice
Powell, held that private university’s full-time faculty
members whose authority in academic matters was
absolute, who decided what courses would be offered,
when they would be scheduled, and to whom they would
be taught, who determined teaching methods, grading
policies, and matriculation standards, and who effectively
decided which students would be admitted, retained and
graduated, exercised supervisory and managerial
functions and were therefore excluded from the category
of employees entitled to benefits of collective bargaining
under the National Labor Relations Act.

Private university’s full-time faculty members
whose authority in academic matters was
absolute, who decided what courses would be
offered, when they would be scheduled, and to
whom they would be taught, who determined
teaching methods, grading policies, and
matriculation standards, and who effectively
decided which students would be admitted,
retained and graduated, exercised supervisory
and managerial functions and were therefore
excluded from the category of employees
entitled to benefits of collective bargaining
under the National Labor Relations Act.
National Labor Relations Act, §§ 1 et seq., 2(3,
11), 14(a) as amended 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et
seq., 152(3, 11), 164(a).

Affirmed.

77 Cases that cite this headnote

Mr. Justice Brennan dissented and filed opinion in which
Mr. Justice White, Mr. Justice Marshall, and Mr. Justice
Blackmun joined.
3
West Headnotes (3)

1

Labor and Employment
Supervisory Employees
For purposes of provision of National Labor
Relations Act excluding managerial employees
from the categories of employees entitled to the
benefits of collective bargaining of the Act,
“managerial employees” are defined as those
who formulate and effectuate management
policies by expressing and making operative the
decisions of their employer; managerial
employees must exercise discretion within or

Labor and Employment
Supervisory Employees

Labor and Employment
Representation proceedings
The absence of factual analysis in National
Labor Relations Board’s opinion which ruled
that full-time faculty members of private
university were managerial employees excluded
them from coverage under the National Labor
Relations Act reflected the Board’s view that the
managerial status of faculty members could be
decided on the basis of conclusory rationales
rather than examination of the facts of each case,
and therefore, the deference normally accorded
the expertise of the Board when its conclusions
are rationally based on articulated facts and
consistent with the Act was not applicable.
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100 Cases that cite this headnote

**857 *672 Syllabus*
Yeshiva University Faculty Association (Union) filed a
representation petition with the National Labor Relations
Board (Board), seeking certification as bargaining agent
for the full-time faculty members of certain schools of
Yeshiva University, a private university. The University
opposed the petition on the ground that all of its faculty
members are managerial or supervisory personnel and
hence not employees within the meaning of the National
Labor Relations Act (Act). The evidence at hearings
before the Board’s hearing officer showed, inter alia, that
a central administrative hierarchy serves all of the
University’s schools, with University-wide policies being
formulated by the central administration upon approval of
the Board of Trustees. However, the individual schools
within the University are substantially autonomous, and
the faculty members at each school effectively determine
its curriculum, grading system, admission and
matriculation standards, academic calendars, and course
schedules. Also, the overwhelming majority of faculty
recommendations as to faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals,
termination, and promotion are implemented. The Board
granted the Union’s petition and directed an election.
Summarily rejecting the University’s contention that its
faculty members are managerial employees, the Board
held that the faculty members are professional employees
entitled to the Act’s protection. After the Union won the
election and was certified, the University refused to
bargain. In subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings,
the Board ordered the University to bargain and sought
enforcement in the Court of Appeals, which denied the
petition. The court agreed that the faculty members are
professional employees under § 2(12) of the Act, found
that the Board had ignored “the extensive control of
Yeshiva’s faculty” over academic and personnel decisions
as well as its “crucial role . . . in determining other central
policies of the institution,” and accordingly held that the
faculty members are endowed with “managerial status”
sufficient to remove them from the Act’s coverage.
*673 Held : The University’s full-time faculty members
are managerial employees excluded from the Act’s
coverage. Pp. 861–866.
(a) The authority structure of a university does not fit
neatly into the statutory scheme, because authority in the
typical “mature” private university is divided between a
central administration and one or more collegial bodies.
The absence of explicit congressional direction does not
preclude the Board from reaching any particular type of
employment, and the Board has approved the formation
of bargaining units composed of faculty members on the

ground that they are “professional employees” under §
2(12) of the Act. Nevertheless professionals may be
exempted from coverage under the judicially implied
exclusion **858 for “managerial employees” when they
are involved in developing and implementing employer
policy. Pp. 861–862.
(b) Here, application of the managerial exclusion to the
University’s faculty members is not precluded on the
theory that they are not aligned with management because
they are expected to exercise “independent professional
judgment” while participating in academic governance
and to pursue professional values rather than institutional
interests. The controlling consideration is that the faculty
exercises authority which in any other context
unquestionably would be managerial, its authority in
academic matters being absolute. The faculty’s
professional interests—as applied to governance at a
university like Yeshiva which depends on the professional
judgment of its faculty to formulate and apply
policies—cannot be separated from those of the
institution, and thus it cannot be said that a faculty
member exercising independent judgment acts primarily
in his own interest and does not represent the interest of
his employer. Pp. 862–866.
(c) The deference ordinarily due the Board’s expertise
does not require reversal of the Court of Appeals’
decision. This Court respects the Board’s expertise when
its conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts
and consistent with the Act, but here the Board’s decision
satisfies neither criterion. P. 867.
2nd Cir., 582 F.2d 686, affirmed.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Norton J. Come, Washington, D. C., for petitioner in no.
78–857.
*674 Ronald H. Shechtman, New York City, for
petitioner in no. 78–997.
Marvin E. Frankel, New York City, for respondent in both
cases.
Opinion
Mr. Justice POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.

Supervisors and managerial employees are excluded from
the categories of employees entitled to the benefits of
collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations
Act.1 The question presented is whether the full-time
faculty of Yeshiva University fall within those exclusions.
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I
Yeshiva is a private university which conducts a broad
range of arts and sciences programs at its five
undergraduate and eight graduate schools in New York
City. On October 30, 1974, the Yeshiva University
Faculty Association (Union) filed a representation petition
with the National Labor Relations Board (Board). The
Union sought certification as bargaining agent for the
full-time faculty members at 10 of the 13 *675 schools.2
The University opposed the petition on the ground that all
of its faculty members are managerial or supervisory
personnel and hence not employees within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act (Act). A
Board-appointed hearing officer held hearings over a
period of five months, generating a voluminous record.
The evidence at the hearings showed that a central
administrative hierarchy serves all of the University’s
schools. Ultimate authority is vested in a Board of
Trustees, whose members (other than the President) hold
no administrative positions at the University. The
President sits on the Board of **859 Trustees and serves
as chief executive officer, assisted by four Vice Presidents
who oversee, respectively, medical affairs and science,
student affairs, business affairs, and academic affairs. An
Executive Council of Deans and administrators makes
recommendations to the President on a wide variety of
matters.
University-wide policies are formulated by the central
administration with the approval of the Board of Trustees,
and include general guidelines dealing with teaching
loads, salary scales, tenure, sabbaticals, retirement, and
fringe benefits. The budget for each school is drafted by
its Dean or Director, subject to approval by the President
after consultation with a committee of administrators. 3
The faculty participate *676 in University-wide
governance through their representatives on an elected
student-faculty
advisory
council.
The
only
University-wide faculty body is the Faculty Review
Committee, composed of elected representatives who
adjust grievances by informal negotiation and also may
make formal recommendations to the Dean of the affected
school or to the President. Such recommendations are
purely advisory.
The individual schools within the University are
substantially autonomous. Each is headed by a Dean or
Director, and faculty members at each school meet
formally and informally to discuss and decide matters of
institutional and professional concern. At four schools,
formal meetings are convened regularly pursuant to
written bylaws. The remaining faculties meet when
convened by the Dean or Director. Most of the schools
also have faculty committees concerned with special areas
of educational policy. Faculty welfare committees

negotiate with administrators concerning salary and
conditions of employment. Through these meetings and
committees, the faculty at each school effectively
determine its curriculum, grading system, admission and
matriculation standards, academic calendars, and course
schedules.4
*677 Faculty power at Yeshiva’s schools extends beyond
strictly academic concerns. The faculty at each school
make recommendations to the Dean or Director in every
case of faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination and
promotion. Although the final decision is reached by the
central administration on the advice of the Dean or
Director, the overwhelming majority of faculty
recommendations are implemented.5 **860 Even when
financial problems in the early 1970’s restricted
Yeshiva’s budget, faculty recommendations still largely
controlled personnel decisions made within the
constraints imposed by the administration. Indeed, the
faculty of one school recently drew up new and binding
policies expanding their own role in these matters. In
addition, some faculties make final decisions regarding
the admission, expulsion, and graduation of individual
students. Others have decided questions involving
teaching loads, student absence policies, tuition and
enrollment levels, and in one case the location of a
school.6

*678 II
A three-member panel of the Board granted the Union’s
petition in December 1975, and directed an election in a
bargaining unit consisting of all full-time faculty
members at the affected schools. 221 N.L.R.B. 1053
(1975). The unit included Assistant Deans, senior
professors, and department chairmen, as well as associate
professors, assistant professors, and instructors.7 Deans
and Directors were excluded. The Board summarily
rejected the University’s contention that its entire faculty
are managerial, viewing the claim as a request for
reconsideration of previous Board decisions on the issue.
Instead of making findings of fact as to Yeshiva, the
Board referred generally to the record and found no
“significan[t]” difference between this faculty and others
it had considered. The Board concluded that the faculty
are professional employees entitled to the protection of
the Act because “faculty participation in collegial
decision making is on a collective rather than individual
basis, it is exercised in the faculty’s own interest rather
than ‘in the interest of the employer,’ and final authority
rests with the board of trustees.” Id., at 1054 (footnote
omitted).8
*679 The Union won the election and was certified by the
Board. The University refused to bargain, reasserting its
view that the faculty are managerial. In the subsequent
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unfair labor practice proceeding, the Board refused to
reconsider its holding in the representation proceeding
and ordered the University to bargain with the Union. 231
N.L.R.B. 597 (1977). When the University still refused to
sit down at the negotiating table, the Board sought
enforcement in the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, which denied the petition. 582 F.2d 686 (1978).
Since the Board had made no findings of fact, the court
examined the record and related the circumstances in
considerable detail. It agreed that the faculty are
professional employees under § 2(12) of the Act. 29
U.S.C. § 152(12). But the court found that the Board had
ignored “the extensive control of Yeshiva’s faculty” over
academic and personnel decisions as well as **861 the
“crucial role of the full-time faculty in determining other
central policies of the institution.” 582 F.2d, at 698. The
court concluded that such power is not an exercise of
individual professional expertise. Rather, the faculty are,
“in effect, substantially and pervasively operating the
enterprise.” Ibid. Accordingly, the court held that the
faculty are endowed with “managerial status” sufficient to
remove them from the coverage of the Act. We granted
certiorari, 440 U.S. 906, 99 S.Ct. 1212, 59 L.Ed.2d 453
(1979), and now affirm.

III
There is no evidence that Congress has considered
whether a university faculty may organize for collective
bargaining under the Act. Indeed, when the Wagner and
Taft-Hartley Acts were approved, it was thought that
congressional power did not extend to university faculties
because they were employed by nonprofit institutions
which did not “affect commerce.” *680 See NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504–505, 99
S.Ct. 1313, 1320–1321, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979).9
Moreover, the authority structure of a university does not
fit neatly within the statutory scheme we are asked to
interpret. The Board itself has noted that the concept of
collegiality “does not square with the traditional authority
structures with which th[e] Act was designed to cope in
the typical organizations of the commercial world.”
Adelphi University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972).
The Act was intended to accommodate the type of
management-employee relations that prevail in the
pyramidal hierarchies of private industry. Ibid. In
contrast, authority in the typical “mature” private
university is divided between a central administration and
one or more collegial bodies. See J. Baldridge, Power and
Conflict in the University 114 (1971). This system of
“shared authority” evolved from the medieval model of
collegial decisionmaking in which guilds of scholars were

responsible only to themselves. See N. Fehl, The Idea of a
University in East and West 36–46 (1962); D. Knowles,
The Evolution of Medieval Thought 164–168 (1962). At
early universities, the faculty were the school. Although
faculties have been subject to external control in the
United States since colonial times, J. Brubacher & W.
Rudy, Higher Education in Transition: A History of
American Colleges and Universities, 1636–1976, pp.
25–30 (3d ed. 1976), traditions of collegiality continue to
play a significant role at many universities, including
Yeshiva.10 For these reasons, the Board has *681
recognized that principles developed for use in the
industrial setting cannot be “imposed blindly on the
academic world.” Syracuse University, 204 N.L.R.B. 641,
643 (1973).
The absence of explicit congressional direction, of course,
does not preclude the Board from reaching any particular
type of employment. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124–131, 64 S.Ct. 851, 857–860, 88
L.Ed. 1170 (1944). Acting under its responsibility for
adapting the broad provisions of the Act to differing
workplaces, the Board asserted jurisdiction over a
university for the first time in 1970. Cornell University,
183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). Within a year it had approved
the formation of bargaining units composed of faculty
members. **862 C. W. Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904
(1971).11 The Board reasoned that faculty members are
“professional employees” within the meaning of § 2(12)
of the Act and therefore are entitled to the benefits of
collective bargaining. 189 N.L.R.B., at 905; 29 U.S.C. §
152(12).12
Yeshiva does not contend that its faculty are not
professionals under the statute. But professionals, like
other employees, may be exempted from coverage under
the Act’s exclusion *682 for “supervisors” who use
independent judgment in overseeing other employees in
the interest of the employer,13 or under the judicially
implied exclusion for “managerial employees” who are
involved in developing and enforcing employer policy. 14
Both exemptions grow out of the same concern: That an
employer is entitled to the undivided loyalty of its
representatives. Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina,
416 U.S. 653, 661–662, 94 S.Ct. 2023, 2027–2028, 40
L.Ed.2d 443 (1974); see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416
U.S. 267, 281–282, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1765, 40 L.Ed.2d 134
(1974). Because the Court of Appeals found the faculty to
be managerial employees, it did not decide the question of
their supervisory status. In view of our agreement with
that court’s application of the managerial exclusion, we
also need not resolve that issue of statutory interpretation.

IV
1 Managerial employees are defined as those who “
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‘formulate and effectuate management policies by
expressing and making operative the decisions of their
employer.’ ” NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 288,
94 S.Ct., at 1768 (quoting Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning
Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323, n. 4 (1947)). These
employees are “much higher in the managerial structure”
than those explicitly mentioned by Congress, which
“regarded [them] as so clearly outside the Act that no
specific exclusionary provision was thought necessary.”
416 U.S., at 283, 94 S.Ct., at 1766. *683 Managerial
employees must exercise discretion within, or even
independently of, established employer policy and must
be aligned with management. See id., at 286–287, 94
S.Ct., at 1767–1768 (citing cases). Although the Board
has established no firm criteria for determining when an
employee is so aligned, normally an employee may be
excluded as managerial only if he represents management
interests by taking or recommending discretionary actions
that effectively control or implement employer policy. 15
The Board does not contend that the Yeshiva faculty’s
decisionmaking is too insignificant **863 to be deemed
managerial.16 Nor does it suggest that the role of the
faculty is merely advisory and thus not managerial. 17
Instead, it contends that the managerial exclusion cannot
be applied in a straightforward fashion to professional
employees because those employees *684 often appear to
be exercising managerial authority when they are merely
performing routine job duties. The status of such
employees, in the Board’s view, must be determined by
reference to the “alignment with management” criterion.
The Board argues that the Yeshiva faculty are not aligned
with management because they are expected to exercise
“independent professional judgment” while participating
in academic governance, and because they are neither
“expected to conform to management policies [nor]
judged according to their effectiveness in carrying out
those policies.” Because of this independence, the Board
contends there is no danger of divided loyalty and no need
for the managerial exclusion. In its view, union pressure
cannot divert the faculty from adhering to the interests of
the university, because the university itself expects its
faculty to pursue professional values rather than
institutional interests. The Board concludes that
application of the managerial exclusion to such
employees would frustrate the national labor policy in
favor of collective bargaining.
This “independent professional judgment” test was not
applied in the decision we are asked to uphold. The
Board’s opinion relies exclusively on its previous faculty
decisions for both legal and factual analysis. 221
N.L.R.B., at 1054. But those decisions only dimly
foreshadow the reasoning now proffered to the Court.
Without explanation, the Board initially announced two
different rationales for faculty cases,18 *685 then quickly
transformed them into a litany to be repeated in case after
case: (i) faculty authority is collective, (ii) it is exercised

in the faculty’s own interest rather than in the interest of
the university, and (iii) final authority rests with the board
of trustees. Northeastern University, 218 N.L.R.B. 247,
250 (1975); University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634, 634
(1974); see Tusculum College, 199 N.L.R.B. 28, 30
(1972).19 In their arguments in this case, the Board’s
lawyers have abandoned the first and third branches of
**864 this analysis,20 which in any event were flatly
inconsistent with its precedents,21 and have transformed
the second into a theory that does not appear clearly in
any Board opinion.22

*686 V
2 The controlling consideration in this case is that the
faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority which in
any other context unquestionably would be managerial.
Their authority in academic matters is absolute. They
decide what courses will be offered, when they will be
scheduled, and to whom they will be taught. They debate
and determine teaching methods, grading policies, and
matriculation standards. They effectively decide which
students will be admitted, retained, and graduated. On
Occasion their views have determined the size of the
student body, the tuition to be charged, and the location of
a school. When one considers the function of a university,
it is difficult to imagine decisions more managerial than
these. To the extent the industrial analogy applies, the
faculty determines within each school the product to be
produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the
customers who will be served.23
The Board nevertheless insists that these decisions are not
managerial because they require the exercise of
independent professional judgment. We are not persuaded
by this argument. There may be some tension between the
Act’s exclusion of managerial employees and its inclusion
of professionals, since most professionals in managerial
positions continue to draw on their special skills and
training. But we have been directed to no authority
suggesting that that tension can be resolved by reference
to the “independent professional judgment” criterion *687
proposed in this case.24 Outside the university context,
the Board routinely has applied the managerial and
supervisory exclusions to professionals in executive
positions **865 without inquiring whether their decisions
were based on management policy rather than
professional expertise.25 Indeed, the Board has twice
implicitly rejected the contention that decisions based on
professional judgment cannot be managerial.26 Since the
Board does not suggest that the “independent professional
judgment” test is to be limited to university faculty, its
new approach would overrule sub silentio this body of
Board precedent and could result in the indiscriminate
recharacterization as covered employees of professionals
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working in supervisory and managerial capacities.
Moreover, the Board’s approach would undermine the
goal it purports to serve: To ensure that employees who
exercise discretionary authority on behalf of the employer
will not *688 divide their loyalty between employer and
union. In arguing that a faculty member exercising
independent judgment acts primarily in his own interest
and therefore does not represent the interest of his
employer, the Board assumes that the professional
interests of the faculty and the interests of the institution
are distinct, separable entities with which a faculty
member could not simultaneously be aligned. The Court
of Appeals found no justification for this distinction, and
we perceive none. In fact, the faculty’s professional
interests—as applied to governance at a university like
Yeshiva—cannot be separated from those of the
institution.
In such a university, the predominant policy normally is
to operate a quality institution of higher learning that will
accomplish broadly defined educational goals within the
limits of its financial resources. The “business” of a
university is education, and its vitality ultimately must
depend on academic policies that largely are formulated
and generally are implemented by faculty governance
decisions. See K. Mortimer & T. McConnell, Sharing
Authority Effectively 23–24 (1978). Faculty members
enhance their own standing and fulfill their professional
mission by ensuring that the university’s objectives are
met. But there can be no doubt that the quest for academic
excellence and institutional distinction is a “policy” to
which the administration expects the faculty to adhere,
whether it be defined as a professional or an institutional
goal. It is fruitless to ask whether an employee is
“expected to conform” to one goal or another when the
two are essentially the same. 27 See *689 NLRB v. Scott
Paper Co., 440 F.2d 625, 630 (CA1 1971) (tractor
owner-operators); Deaton Truck Line, Inc. v. NLRB, 337
F.2d 697, 699 (CA5 1964) (same), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
903, 85 S.Ct. 1448, 14 L.Ed.2d 285 (1965).
The problem of divided loyalty is particularly acute for a
university like Yeshiva, which depends on the
professional judgment of its faculty to formulate and
apply **866 crucial policies constrained only by
necessarily general institutional goals. The university
requires faculty participation in governance because
professional expertise is indispensable to the formulation
and implementation of academic policy.28 It may appear,
as the Board contends, that the professor performing
governance functions is less “accountable” for departures
from institutional policy than a middle-level industrial
manager whose discretion is more confined. Moreover,
traditional systems of collegiality and tenure insulate the
professor from some of the sanctions applied to an
industrial manager who fails to adhere to company policy.

But the analogy of the university to industry need not, and
indeed cannot, be complete. It is clear that Yeshiva and
like universities must rely on their faculties to participate
in the making and implementation of their policies.29 The
large measure of independence *690 enjoyed by faculty
members can only increase the danger that divided loyalty
will lead to those harms that the Board traditionally has
sought to prevent.
We certainly are not suggesting an application of the
managerial exclusion that would sweep all professionals
outside the Act in derogation of Congress’ expressed
intent to protect them. The Board has recognized that
employees whose decisionmaking is limited to the routine
discharge of professional duties in projects to which they
have been assigned cannot be excluded from coverage
even if union membership arguably may involve some
divided loyalty.30 Only if an employee’s activities fall
outside the scope of the duties routinely performed by
similarly situated professionals will he be found aligned
with management. We think these decisions accurately
capture the intent of Congress, and that they provide an
appropriate starting point for analysis in cases involving
professionals alleged to be managerial.31

*691 **867 VI
3 Finally, the Board contends that the deference due its
expertise in these matters requires us to reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals. The question we decide
today is a mixed one of fact and law. But the Board’s
opinion may be searched in vain for relevant findings of
fact. The absence of factual analysis apparently reflects
the Board’s view that the managerial status of particular
faculties may be decided on the basis of conclusory
rationales rather than examination of the facts of each
case. The Court of Appeals took a different view, and
determined that the faculty of Yeshiva University, “in
effect, substantially and pervasively operat[e] the
enterprise.” 582 F.2d at 698. We find no reason to reject
this conclusion. As our decisions consistently show, we
accord great respect to the expertise of the Board when its
conclusions are rationally based on articulated facts and
consistent with the Act. Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB,
437 U.S. 483, 501, 98 S.Ct. 2463, 2473, 57 L.Ed.2d 370
(1978). In this case, we hold that the Board’s decision
satisfies neither criterion.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice WHITE,
Mr. Justice MARSHALL, and Mr. Justice BLACKMUN
join, dissenting.
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In holding that the full-time faculty members of Yeshiva
University are not covered employees under the National
Labor Relations Act, but instead fall within the exclusion
for *692 supervisors and managerial employees, the Court
disagrees with the determination of the National Labor
Relations Board. Because I believe that the Board’s
decision was neither irrational nor inconsistent with the
Act, I respectfully dissent.

I
Ten years ago the Board first asserted jurisdiction over
private nonprofit institutions of higher education. Cornell
University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970). Since then, the
Board has often struggled with the Procrustean task of
attempting to implement in the altogether different
environment of the academic community the broad
directives of a statutory scheme designed for the
bureaucratic industrial workplace. See, e. g., Adelphi
University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972). Resolution of
the particular issue presented in this case—whether
full-time faculty members are covered “employees” under
the Act—is but one of several challenges confronting the
Board in this “unchartered area.” C. W. Post Center, 189
N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1971).
Because at the time of the Act’s passage Congress did not
contemplate its application to private universities, it is not
surprising that the terms of the Act itself provide no
answer to the question before us. Indeed, the statute
evidences significant tension as to congressional intent in
this respect by its explicit inclusion, on the one hand, of
“professional employees” under § 2(12), 29 U.S.C. §
152(12), and its exclusion, on the other, of “supervisors”
under § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). Similarly, when
transplanted to the academic arena, the Act’s extension of
coverage to professionals under § 2(12) cannot easily be
squared with the Board-created exclusion of “managerial
employees” in the industrial context. See generally NLRB
v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40
L.Ed.2d 134 (1974).
Primary authority to resolve these conflicts and to adapt
the Act to the changing patterns of industrial relations was
*693 entrusted to the Board, not to the judiciary. NLRB v.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266, 95 S.Ct. 959, 969,
43 L.Ed.2d 171 (1975). The Court has often admonished
that “[t]he ultimate problem is the balancing of the
conflicting legitimate interests. The function of striking
that balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a
difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress
committed primarily to the National Labor Relations
Board, subject to limited judicial review.” **868 NLRB
v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87, 96, 77 S.Ct. 643, 648, 1

L.Ed.2d 676 (1957). Accord, Beth Israel Hospital v.
NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 501, 98 S.Ct. 2463, 2473, 57
L.Ed.2d 370 (1978); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221, 235–236, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 1149, 10 L.Ed.2d 308
(1963). Through its cumulative experience in dealing with
labor-management relations in a variety of industrial and
nonindustrial settings, it is the Board that has developed
the expertise to determine whether coverage of a
particular category of employees would further the
objectives of the Act.1 And through its continuous
oversight of industrial conditions, it is the Board that is
best able to formulate and adjust national labor policy to
conform to the realities of industrial life. Accordingly, the
judicial role is limited; a court may not substitute its own
judgment for that of the Board. The Board’s decision may
be reviewed for its rationality and its consistency with the
*694 Act, but once these criteria are satisfied, the order
must be enforced. See Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB,
supra, 437 U.S., at 501, 98 S.Ct., at 2473.

II
In any event, I believe the Board reached the correct
result in determining that Yeshiva’s full-time faculty is
covered under the NLRA. The Court does not dispute that
the faculty members are “professional employees” for the
purposes of collective bargaining under § 2(12), but
nevertheless finds them excluded from coverage under the
implied exclusion for managerial employees.”2 The Court
explains that “[t]he controlling consideration in this case
is that the faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority
which in any other context unquestionably would be
managerial.” Ante, at 864. But the academic community is
simply not “any other context.” The Court purports to
recognize that there are fundamental differences between
the authority structures of the typical industrial and
academic institutions which preclude the blind
transplanting of principles developed in one arena onto
the other; yet it nevertheless ignores those very
differences in concluding that Yeshiva’s faculty is
excluded from the Act’s coverage.
As reflected in the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley
Amendments of 1947, the concern behind the exclusion
of supervisors under § 2(11) of the Act is twofold. On the
one hand, Congress sought to protect the rank-and-file
employees from being unduly influenced in their selection
of leaders by the presence of management representatives
in their union. “If supervisors were members of and active
in the union which represented the employees they
supervised it could be possible *695 for the supervisors to
obtain and retain positions of power in the union by
reason of their authority over their fellow union members
while working on the job.” NLRB v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 1169, 1178 (CA2 1968). In addition,
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Congress wanted to ensure that employers would not be
deprived of the **869 undivided loyalty of their
supervisory foremen. Congress was concerned that if
supervisors were allowed to affiliate with labor
organizations that represented the rank and file, they
might become accountable to the workers, thus interfering
with the supervisors’ ability to discipline and control the
employees in the interest of the employer.3
Identical considerations underlie the exclusion of
managerial employees. See ante, at 862. Although a
variety of verbal formulations have received judicial
approval over the years, see Retail Clerks International
Assn. v. NLRB, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 63, 65–66, 366 F.2d
642, 644–645 (1966), this Court has recently sanctioned a
definition of “managerial employee” that comprises those
who “ ‘formulate and effectuate management policies by
expressing and making operative the decisions of their
employer.’ ” See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.,
at 288, 94 S.Ct. at 1768. The touchstone of managerial
status is thus an alliance with management, and the
pivotal inquiry is whether the employee in performing his
*696 duties represents his own interests or those of his
employer.4 If his actions are undertaken for the purpose of
implementing the employer’s policies, then he is
accountable to management and may be subject to
conflicting loyalties. But if the employee is acting only on
his own behalf and in his own interest, he is covered
under the Act and is entitled to the benefits of collective
bargaining.
After examining the voluminous record in this case, 5 the
Board determined that the faculty at Yeshiva exercised its
decisionmaking authority in its own interest rather than
“in the interest of the employer.” 221 N.L.R.B. 1053,
1054 (1975). The Court, in contrast, can perceive “no
justification for this distinction” and concludes that the
faculty’s interests “cannot be separated from those of the
institution.” Ante, at 865.6 But the Court’s vision is
clouded by its failure fully to discern and comprehend the
nature of the faculty’s role in university governance.
Unlike the purely hierarchical decisionmaking structure
that prevails in the typical industrial organization, the
bureaucratic foundation of most “mature” universities is
characterized by dual authority systems. The primary
decisional *697 network is hierarchical in nature:
Authority is lodged in the administration, and a formal
chain of command runs from a lay governing board down
through university officers to individual **870 faculty
members and students. At the same time, there exists a
parallel professional network, in which formal
mechanisms have been created to bring the expertise of
the faculty into the decisionmaking process. See J.
Baldridge, Power and Conflict in the University 114
(1971); Finkin, The NLRB in Higher Education, 5
U.Toledo L.Rev. 608, 614–618 (1974).

What the Board realized—and what the Court fails to
apprehend—is that whatever influence the faculty wields
in university decisionmaking is attributable solely to its
collective expertise as professional educators, and not to
any managerial or supervisory prerogatives. Although the
administration may look to the faculty for advice on
matters of professional and academic concern, the faculty
offers its recommendations in order to serve its own
independent interest in creating the most effective
environment for learning, teaching, and scholarship.7 And
while the administration may attempt to defer to the
faculty’s competence whenever possible, it must and does
apply its own distinct perspective to those
recommendations, a perspective that is based on fiscal
*698 and other managerial policies which the faculty has
no part in developing. The University always retains the
ultimate decisionmaking authority, see ante, at 858–859,
and the administration gives what weight and import to
the faculty’s collective judgment as it chooses and deems
consistent with its own perception of the institution’s
needs and objectives.8
The premise of a finding of managerial status is a
determination that the excluded employee is acting on
behalf of management and is answerable to a higher
authority in the exercise of his responsibilities. The Board
has consistently implemented this requirement—both for
professional and non-professional employees—by
conferring managerial status only upon those employees
“whose interests are closely aligned with management as
true representatives of management.” (Emphasis added.)
E. g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, 227
N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1976); *699 Bell Aerospace, 219
N.L.R.B. 384, 385 (1975); **871 General Dynamics
Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974).9 Only if the
employee is expected to conform to management policies
and is judged by his effectiveness in executing those
policies does the danger of divided loyalties exist.
Yeshiva’s faculty, however, is not accountable to the
administration in its governance function, nor is any
individual faculty member subject to personal sanction or
control based on the administration’s assessment of the
worth of his recommendations. When the faculty, through
the schools’ advisory committees, participates in
university decisionmaking on subjects of academic
policy, it does not serve as the “representative of
management.”10 Unlike industrial supervisors *700 and
managers, university professors are not hired to “make
operative” the policies and decisions of their employer.
Nor are they retained on the condition that their interests
will correspond to those of the university administration.
Indeed, the notion that a faculty member’s professional
competence could depend on his undivided loyalty to
management is antithetical to the whole concept of
academic freedom. Faculty members are judged by their
employer on the quality of their teaching and scholarship,

© 2012 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss7/26
DOI: 10.58188/1941-8043.1077

8

8

Levine: Workshop: Negotiations 103 CLE Credit - N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva Unive

N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980)
100 S.Ct. 856, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2526, 63 L.Ed.2d 115, 87 Lab.Cas. P 11,819

not on the compatibility of their advice with
administration policy. Board Member Kennedy aptly
concluded in his concurring opinion in Northeastern
University, 218 N.L.R.B. 247, 257 (1975) (footnote
omitted):
“[T]he influence which the faculty exercises in many
areas of academic governance is insufficient to make
them ‘managerial’ employees. Such influence is not
exercised ‘for management’ or ‘in the interest of the
employer,’ but rather is exercised in their own
professional interest. The best evidence of this fact is
that faculty members are generally not held
accountable by or to the administration for their faculty
governance
functions.
Faculty
criticism
of
administration policies, for example, is viewed not as a
breach of loyalty, but as an exercise in academic
freedom. So, too, intervention by the university
administration in faculty deliberations would most
likely be considered an infringement upon academic
freedoms. Conversely, university administrations rarely
consider
themselves
bound
by
faculty
recommendations.”
It is no answer to say, as does the Court, that Yeshiva’s
faculty and administration are one and the same because
their interests tend to coincide. In the first place, the
National Labor Relations Act does not condition its
coverage on an antagonism of interests between the
employer and the employee. *701 11 The mere
coincidence of interests **872 on many issues has never
been thought to abrogate the right to collective bargaining
on those topics as to which that coincidence is absent.
Ultimately, the performance of an employee’s duties will
always further the interests of the employer, for in no
institution do the interests of labor and management
totally diverge. Both desire to maintain stable and
profitable operations, and both are committed to creating
the best possible product within existing financial
constraints. Differences of opinion and emphasis may
develop, however, on exactly how to devote the
institution’s resources to achieve those goals. When these
disagreements surface, the national labor laws
contemplate their resolution through the peaceful process
of collective bargaining. And in this regard, Yeshiva
University stands on the same footing as any other
employer.
Moreover, the congruence of interests in this case ought
not to be exaggerated. The university administration has
certain economic and fiduciary responsibilities that are
not shared by the faculty, whose primary concerns are
academic and relate solely to its own professional
reputation. The record evinces numerous instances in
which the faculty’s recommendations have been rejected
by the administration on account of fiscal constraints or
other managerial policies. Disputes have arisen between

Yeshiva’s faculty and administration on such fundamental
issues as the hiring, tenure, promotion, retirement, and
dismissal of faculty members, *702 academic standards
and credits, departmental budgets, and even the faculty’s
choice of its own departmental representative.12 The very
fact that Yeshiva’s faculty has voted for the Union to
serve as its representative in future negotiations with the
administration indicates that the faculty does not perceive
its interests to be aligned with those of management.
Indeed, on the precise topics which are specified as
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining—wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment13—the interests of teacher and administrator
are often diametrically opposed.
Finally, the Court’s perception of the Yeshiva faculty’s
status is distorted by the rose-colored lens through which
it views the governance structure of the modern-day
university. The Court’s conclusion that the faculty’s
professional interests are indistinguishable from those of
the administration is bottomed on an idealized model of
collegial decisionmaking that is a vestige of the great
medieval university. But the university of today bears
little resemblance to the “community of scholars” of
yesteryear.14 **873 Education has become *703 “big
business,” and the task of operating the university
enterprise has been transferred from the faculty to an
autonomous administration, which faces the same
pressures to cut costs and increase efficiencies that
confront any large industrial organization.15 The past
decade of budgetary cutbacks, declining enrollments,
reductions in faculty appointments, curtailment of
academic programs, and increasing calls for
accountability to alumni and other special interest groups
has only added to the erosion of the faculty’s role in the
institution’s decisonmaking process.16
*704 These economic exigencies have also exacerbated
the tensions in university labor relations, as the faculty
and administration more and more frequently find
themselves advocating conflicting positions not only on
issues of compensation, job security, and working
conditions, but even on subjects formerly thought to be
the faculty’s prerogative. In response to this friction, and
in an attempt to avoid the strikes and work stoppages that
have disrupted several major universities in recent years,
many faculties have entered into collective-bargaining
relationships with their administrations and governing
boards.17 An even greater number of schools—Yeshiva
among them—have endeavored to negotiate and
compromise their differences informally, by establishing
avenues for faculty input into university decisions on
matters of professional concern.
*705 Today’s decision, however, threatens to eliminate
much of the administration’s incentive to resolve its
disputes with the faculty through open discussion and
mutual agreement. By its overbroad and unwarranted
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interpretation of the managerial exclusion, **874 the
Court denies the faculty the protections of the NLRA and,
in so doing, removes whatever deterrent value the Act’s
availability may offer against unreasonable administrative
conduct.18 Rather than promoting the Act’s objective of
funneling dissension between employers and employees
into collective bargaining, the Court’s decision
undermines that goal and contributes to the possibility
that “recurring disputes [will] fester outside the
negotiation process until strikes or other forms of
economic warfare occur.” Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441
U.S. 488, 499, 99 S.Ct. 1842, 1850, 60 L.Ed.2d 420
(1979).

encapsulate the fine distinction between those
professional employees who are entitled to the NLRA’s
protections and those whose managerial responsibilities
require their exclusion,19 the Board concluded *706 that
Yeshiva’s full-time faculty qualify as the former rather
than the latter. I believe the Board made the correct
determination. But even were I to have reservations about
the specific result reached by the Board on the facts of
this case, I would certainly have to conclude that the
Board applied a proper mode of analysis to arrive at a
decision well within the zone of reasonableness.
Accordingly, in light of the deference due the Board’s
determination in this complex area, I would reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

III
Parallel Citations
In sum, the Board analyzed both the essential purposes
underlying the supervisory and managerial exclusions and
the nature of the governance structure at Yeshiva
University. Relying on three factors that attempt to

100 S.Ct. 856, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2526, 63 L.Ed.2d
115, 87 Lab.Cas. P 11,819

Footnotes

*

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience
of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499.

1

49 Stat. 449, as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11), 164(a); NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974).

2

The schools involved are Yeshiva College, Stern College for Women, Teacher’s Institute for Women, Erna Michael College,
Yeshiva Program, James Striar School of General Jewish Studies, Belfer Graduate School of Sciences, Ferkauf Graduate School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, Wurzweiler School of Social Work, and Bernard Revel Graduate School. The Union did not seek
to represent the faculty of the medical school, the graduate school of medical sciences, the Yeshiva High School, or any of the
theological programs affiliated with the University. A law school has been opened since the time of the hearings, but it does not
figure in this case.

3

At Yeshiva College, budget requests prepared by the senior professor in each subject area receive the “perfunctory” approval of the
Dean “99 percent” of the time and have never been rejected by the central administration. App. 298–299. A council of elected
department chairmen at Ferkauf approves the school’s budget allocations when discretionary funds are available. Id., at 626–627.
All of these professors were included in the bargaining unit approved by the Board.

4

For example, the Deans at Yeshiva and Erna Michael Colleges regard faculty actions as binding. Id., at 248–249, 312–313.
Administrators testified that no academic initiative of either faculty had been vetoed since at least 1968. Id., at 250, 313. When the
Stern College faculty disagreed with the Dean’s decision to delete the education major, the major was reinstituted. Id., at 191. The
Director of the Teacher’s Institute for Women testified that “the faculty is the school,” id., at 379, while the Director of the James
Striar School described his position as the “executive arm of the faculty,” which had overruled him on occasion, id., at 360–361.
All decisions regarding academic matters at the Yeshiva Program and Bernard Revel are made by faculty consensus. Id., at 574,
583–586. The “internal operation of [Wurzweiler] has been heavily governed by faculty decisions,” according to its Dean. Id., at
502.

5

One Dean estimated that 98% of faculty hiring recommendations were ultimately given effect. Id., at 624. Others could not recall
an instance when a faculty recommendation had been overruled. Id., at 193–194. At Stern College, the Dean in six years has never
overturned a promotion decision. Ibid. The President has accepted all decisions of the Yeshiva College faculty as to promotions
and sabbaticals, including decisions opposed by the Dean. Id., at 268–270. At Erna Michael, the Dean has never hired a full-time
faculty member without the consent of the affected senior professor, id., at 333–335, and the Director of Teacher’s Institute for
Women stated baldly that no teacher had ever been hired if “there was the slightest objection, even on one faculty member’s part.”
Id., at 388. The faculty at both these schools have overridden recommendations made by the deans. No promotion or grant of
tenure has ever been made at Ferkauf over faculty opposition. Id., at 620, 633. The Dean of Belfer testified that he had no right to
override faculty decisions on tenure and nonrenewal. Id., at 419.
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6

The Director of Teacher’s Institute for Women once recommended that the school move to Brooklyn to attract students. The
faculty rejected the proposal and the school remained in Manhattan. Id., at 379–380.

7

“Full-time faculty” were defined as those
“appointed to the University in the titles of professor, associate professor, assistant professor, instructor, or any adjunct or
visiting thereof, department chairmen, division chairmen, senior faculty and assistant deans, but excluding . . . part-time faculty;
lecturers; principal investigators; deans, acting deans and directors; [and others not relevant to this action].” 221 N.L.R.B., at
1057.
The term “faculty” in this opinion refers to the members of this unit as defined by the Board.

8

Identical language had been employed in at least two other Board decisions. See infra, at 863. In this case, it was not supported by
a single citation to the record. Mr. Justice BRENNAN’s dissent relies on this language, post, at 869, and adds that a faculty’s
“primary concerns are academic and relate solely to its own professional reputation,” post, at 872. The view that faculty
governance authority “is exercised in the faculty’s own interest” rather than that of the University assumes a lack of responsibility
that certainly is not reflected in this record.

9

See also S.Rep.No.573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1935) (dispute between employer and college professor would not be covered);
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (1947) U.S.Code Cong.Serv.1947, p. 1135 (listing professional employees
covered by new statutory provision without mentioning teachers); S.Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 11, 19 (1947) (same).

10

See the inaugural address of Williams College President Paul Ansel Chadbourne, quoted in Kahn, The NLRB and Higher
Education: The Failure of Policymaking Through Adjudication, 21 UCLA L.Rev. 63, 70, n. 16 (1973) ( “ ‘Professors are
sometimes spoken of as working for the college. They are the college’ ”) (emphasis in original); Davis, Unions and Higher
Education: Another View, 49 Ed. Record 139, 143 (1968) (“The president . . . is not the faculty’s master. He is as much the
faculty’s administrator as he is the board [of trustees’]”); n. 4, supra.

11

The Board has suggested that Congress tacitly approved the formation of faculty units in 1974, when the Act was amended to
eliminate the exemption accorded to nonprofit hospitals. Although Congress appears to have agreed that nonprofit institutions
“affect commerce” under modern economic conditions, H.R.Rep.No.93–1051, p. 4 (1974); 120 Cong.Rec. 12938 (1974) (remarks
of Sen. Williams), there is nothing to suggest that Congress considered the status of university faculties.

12

The Act provides broadly that “employees” have organizational and other rights. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 2(3) defines “employee”
in general terms, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3); § 2(12) defines “professional employee” in some detail, 29 U.S.C. § 152(12); and § 9(b)(1)
prohibits the Board from creating a bargaining unit that includes both professional and nonprofessional employees unless a
majority of the professionals vote for inclusion, 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1).

13

An employee may be excluded if he has authority over any one of 12 enumerated personnel actions, including hiring and firing. 29
U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 152(11), 164(a). The Board has held repeatedly that professionals may be excluded as supervisors. E. g.,
University of Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B. 423, 426 (1976); Presbyterian Medical Center, 218 N.L.R.B. 1266, 1267–1269 (1975).

14

NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974). The Board never has doubted that the
managerial exclusion may be applied to professionals in a proper case. E. g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, 227
N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (1976); see General Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857–858 (1974); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 113
N.L.R.B. 337, 339 (1955).

15

E. g., Sutter Community Hospitals of Sacramento, supra, at 193; Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B. 384, 385–386 (1975) (on remand);
General Dynamics Corp., supra, at 857; see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., supra, at 274, 286–289, 94 S.Ct., at 1761–1762,
1767–1769.

16

The Board has found decisions of far less significance to the employer to be managerial when the affected employees were aligned
with management. Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753 (1956) (procurement drivers who made purchases for employers);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 571, 573 (1955) (production schedulers); Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 194,
196 (1953) (lecturers who indoctrinated new employees); Western Electric Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 420, 423 (1952) (personnel
investigators who made hiring recommendations); American Locomotive Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 115, 116–117 (1950) (buyers who made
substantial purchases on employer’s behalf).

17

The Union does argue that the faculty’s authority is merely advisory. But the fact that the administration holds a rarely exercised
veto power does not diminish the faculty’s effective power in policymaking and implementation. See nn. 4, 5, supra. The statutory
definition of “supervisor” expressly contemplates that those employees who “effectively . . . recommend” the enumerated actions
are to be excluded as supervisory. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). Consistent with the concern for divided loyalty, the relevant consideration
is effective recommendation or control rather than final authority. That rationale applies with equal force to the managerial
exclusion.
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18

Two cases simply announced that faculty authority is neither managerial nor supervisory because it is exercised collectively. C. W.
Post Center, 189 N.L.R.B. 904, 905 (1971); Fordham University, 193 N.L.R.B. 134, 135 (1971). The Board later acknowledged
that “a genuine system of collegiality would tend to confound us,” but held that the modern university departs from that system
because “ultimate authority” is vested in a board of trustees which neither attempts to convert the faculty into managerial entities
nor advises them to advocate management interests. Adelphi University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972). See Fairleigh Dickinson
University, 227 N.L.R.B. 239, 241 (1976).

19

Citing these three factors, the Board concludes in each case that faculty are professional employees. It has never explained the
reasoning connecting the premise with the conclusion, although an argument similar to that made by its lawyers in this case
appears in one concurring opinion. Northeastern University, 218 N.L.R.B., at 257 (opinion of Member Kennedy).

20

Although the Board has preserved the points in footnotes to its brief, it no longer contends that “collective authority” and “lack of
ultimate authority” are legal rationales. They are now said to be facts which, respectively, “fortif[y]” the Board’s view that faculty
members act in their own interest, and contradict the premise that the university is a “self-governing communit[y] of scholars.”
Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 78–857, p. 11, n. 8. Cf. n. 8, supra.

21

The “collective authority” branch has never been applied to supervisors who work through committees. E. g., Florida Southern
College, 196 N.L.R.B. 888, 889 (1972). Nor was it thought to bar managerial status for employees who owned enough stock to
give them, as a group, a substantial voice in the employer’s affairs. See Sida of Hawaii, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 194, 195 (1971); Red
and White Airway Cab Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 83, 85 (1959); Brookings Plywood Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 794, 798–799 (1952). Ultimate
authority, the third branch, has never been thought to be a prerequisite to supervisory or managerial status. Indeed, it could not be
since every corporation vests that power in its board of directors.

22

We do not, of course, substitute counsel’s post hoc rationale for the reasoning supplied by the Board itself. SEC v. Chenery Corp.,
332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1577, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947). Because the first and third branches of the Board’s analysis are
insupportable, the Board’s only colorable theory is the “interest of the employer” branch. The argument presented to us is an
expanded and considerably refined version of that notion.

23

The record shows that faculty members at Yeshiva also play a predominant role in faculty hiring, tenure, sabbaticals, termination
and promotion. See supra, at 859–860, and n. 5. These decisions clearly have both managerial and supervisory characteristics.
Since we do not reach the question of supervisory status, we need not rely primarily on these features of faculty authority.

24

The Board has cited no case directly applying an “independent professional judgment” standard. On the related question of
accountability for implementation of management policies, it cites only NLRB v. Fullerton Publishing Co., 283 F.2d 545, 550
(CA9 1960), which held that a news editor “responsibly directed” his department so as to fall within the definition of a supervisor,
29 U.S.C. § 152(11). The court looked in part to accountability in rejecting the claim that the editor merely relayed assignments
and thus was not “responsible” for directing employees as required by the statute. The case did not involve the managerial
exclusion and has no application to the issues before us.

25

See cases cited in nn. 13 and 14, supra. A strict “conformity to management policy” test ignores the dual nature of the managerial
role, since managers by definition not only conform to established policies but also exercise their own judgment within the range
of those policies. See Bell Aerospace, 219 N.L.R.B., at 385 (quoting Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 569, 571
(1963)).

26

University of Chicago Library, 205 N.L.R.B. 220, 221–222, 229 (1973), enf’d, 506 F.2d 1402 (CA7 1974) (reversing an
Administrative Law Judge’s decision which had been premised on the “professional judgment” rationale); Sutter Community
Hospitals of Sacramento, 227 N.L.R.B., at 193 (excluding as managerial a clinical specialist who used interdisciplinary
professional skills to run a hospital department).

27

At Yeshiva, administrative concerns with scarce resources and University-wide balance have led to occasional vetoes of faculty
action. But such infrequent administrative reversals in no way detract from the institution’s primary concern with the academic
responsibilities entrusted to the faculty. The suggestion that faculty interests depart from those of the institution with respect to
salary and benefits is even less meritorious. The same is true of every supervisory or managerial employee. Indeed, there is
arguably a greater community of interest on this point in the university than in industry, because the nature and quality of a
university depend so heavily on the faculty attracted to the institution. B. Richman & R. Farmer, Leadership, Goals, and Power in
Higher Education 258 (1974); see D. Bornheimer, G. Burns, & G. Dumke, The Faculty in Higher Education 174–175 (1973).

28

See American Association for Higher Education, Faculty Participation in Academic Governance 22–24 (1967); Bornheimer,
Burns, & Dumke, supra, at 149–150; Kadish, The Theory of the Profession and Its Predicament, 58 A.A.U.P.Bull. 120, 121
(1972). The extent to which Yeshiva faculty recommendations are implemented is no “mere coincidence,” as Mr. Justice
BRENNAN’s dissent suggests. Post, at 872. Rather this is an inevitable characteristic of the governance structure adopted by
universities like Yeshiva.
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29

The dissent concludes, citing several secondary authorities, that the modern university has undergone changes that have shifted
“the task of operating the university enterprise” from faculty to administration. Post, at 872–873. The shift, if it exists, is neither
universal nor complete. See K. Mortimer & T. McConnell, Sharing Authority Effectively 27–28, 158–162, 164–165 (1978). In any
event, our decision must be based on the record before us. Nor can we decide this case by weighing the probable benefits and
burdens of faculty collective bargaining. See post, at 872–874. That, after all, is a matter for Congress, not this Court.

30

For this reason, architects and engineers functioning as project captains for work performed by teams of professionals are deemed
employees despite substantial planning responsibility and authority to direct and evaluate team members. See General Dynamics
Corp., 213 N.L.R.B., at 857–858; Wurster, Bernardi & Emmons, Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 1049, 1051 (1971); Skidmore, Owings &
Merrill, 192 N.L.R.B. 920, 921 (1971). See also Doctors’ Hospital of Modesto, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 950, 951–952 (1970), enf’d,
489 F.2d 772 (CA9 1973) (nurses); National Broadcasting Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 1440, 1441 (1966) (broadcast newswriters). In the
health-care context, the Board asks in each case whether the decisions alleged to be managerial or supervisory are “incidental to”
or “in addition to” the treatment of patients, a test Congress expressly approved in 1974. S.Rep. No. 93–766, p. 6 (1974), U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News, 1974, p. 3946.

31

We recognize that this is a starting point only, and that other factors not present here may enter into the analysis in other contexts.
It is plain, for example, that professors may not be excluded merely because they determine the content of their own courses,
evaluate their own students, and supervise their own research. There thus may be institutions of higher learning unlike Yeshiva
where the faculty are entirely or predominantly nonmanagerial. There also may be faculty members at Yeshiva and like
universities who properly could be included in a bargaining unit. It may be that a rational line could be drawn between tenured and
untenured faculty members, depending upon how a faculty is structured and operates. But we express no opinion on these
questions, for it is clear that the unit approved by the Board was far too broad.

1

“It is not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive limitation around the term ‘employee.’ That task has been assigned
primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act. Determination of ‘where all the conditions of the relation
require protection’ involves inquiries for the Board charged with this duty. Everyday experience in the administration of the statute
gives it familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment relationships in various industries, with the abilities
and needs of the workers for self organization and collective action, and with the adaptability of collective bargaining for the
peaceful settlement of their disputes with their employers. The experience thus acquired must be brought frequently to bear on the
question who is an employee under the Act. Resolving that question . . . ‘belongs to the usual administrative routine’ of the Board.”
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130, 64 S.Ct. 851, 860, 88 L.Ed. 1170 (1944). Accord, NLRB v. Seven-Up
Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349, 73 S.Ct. 287, 290, 97 L.Ed. 377 (1953).

2

Because the Court concludes that Yeshiva’s full-time faculty are managerial employees, it finds it unnecessary to reach the
University’s contention that the faculty are also excluded as “supervisors” under § 2 (11). Ante, at 862. My discussion therefore
focuses on the question of the faculty’s managerial status, but I would resolve the issue of their supervisory status in a similar
fashion.

3

See H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (1947):
“The evidence before the committee shows clearly that unionizing supervisors under the Labor Act is inconsistent
with the purpose of the act . . . . It is inconsistent with the policy of Congress to assure to workers freedom from
domination or control by their supervisors in their organizing and bargaining activities. It is inconsistent with our
policy to protect the rights of employers; they, as well as workers, are entitled to loyal representatives in the
plants, but when the foremen unionize, even in a union that claims to be ‘independent’ of the union of the rank
and file, they are subject to influence and control by the rank and file union, and, instead of their bossing the rank
and file, the rank and file bosses them.”
See also S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3–5 (1947).

4

Section 2(11) of the Act requires, as a condition of supervisory status, that authority be exercised “in the interest of the employer.”
29 U.S.C. § 152(11). See also NLRB v. Master Stevedores Assn., 418 F.2d 140 (CA5 1969); International Union of United Brewery
Workers v. NLRB, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 298 F.2d 297 (1961).

5

The Board held hearings over a 5-month period and compiled a record containing more than 4,600 pages of testimony and 200
exhibits.

6

The Court thus determines that all of Yeshiva’s full-time faculty members are managerial employees, even though their role in
university decisionmaking is limited to the professional recommendations of the faculty acting as a collective body, and even
though they supervise and manage no personnel other than themselves. The anomaly of such a result demonstrates the error in
extending the managerial exclusion to a class of essentially rank-and-file employees who do not represent the interests of
management and who are not subject to the danger of conflicting loyalties which motivated the adoption of that exemption.
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As the Board has recognized, due to the unique nature of their work, professional employees will often make recommendations on
7
matters that are of great importance to management. But their desire to exert influence in these areas stems from the need to
maintain their own professional standards, and this factor—common to all professionals—should not, by itself, preclude their
inclusion in a bargaining unit. See Westinghouse Electric Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. 337, 339–340 (1955). In fact, Congress clearly
recognized both that professional employees consistently exercise independent judgment and discretion in the performance of their
duties, see 29 U.S.C. § 152(12), and that they have a significant interest in maintaining certain professional standards, see S.Rep.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1947). Yet Congress specifically included professionals within the Act’s coverage. See NLRB v.
Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 298, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1773, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974) (WHITE, J., dissenting in part).

8

One must be careful not to overvalue the significance of the faculty’s influence on academic affairs. As one commentator has
noted, “it is not extraordinary for employees to seek to exert influence over matters embedded in an employment relationship for
which they share a concern, or that management would be responsive to their strongly held desires.” Finkin, The NLRB in Higher
Education, 5 U.Toledo L.Rev. 608, 616 (1974). Who, after all, is better suited than the faculty to decide what courses should be
offered, how they should be taught, and by what standards their students should be graded? Employers will often attempt to defer
to their employees’ suggestions, particularly where—as here—those recommendations relate to matters within the unique
competence of the employees.
Moreover, insofar as faculty members are given some say in more traditional managerial decisions such as the hiring and
promotion of other personnel, such discretion does not constitute an adequate basis for the conferral of managerial or
supervisory status. Indeed, in the typical industrial context, it is not uncommon for the employees’ union to be given the
exclusive right to recommend personnel to the employer, and these hiring-hall agreements have been upheld even where the
union requires a worker to pass a union-administered skills test as a condition of referral. See, e. g., Local 42 (Catalytic Constr.
Co.), 164 N.L.R.B. 916 (1967); see generally Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 81 S.Ct. 835, 6 L.Ed.2d 11 (1961).

9

The Board has also explained that the ability of the typical professional employee to influence company policy does not bestow
managerial authority:
“Work which is based on professional competence necessarily involves a consistent exercise of discretion and judgment, else
professionalism would not be involved. Nevertheless, professional employees plainly are not the same as management
employees either by definition or in authority, and managerial authority is not vested in professional employees merely by virtue
of their professional status, or because work performed in that status may have a bearing on company direction.” General
Dynamics Corp., 213 N.L.R.B., at 857–858.

10

Where faculty members actually do serve as management’s representatives, the Board has not hesitated to exclude them from the
Act’s coverage as managerial or supervisory personnel. Compare University of Vermont, 223 N.L.R.B. 423 (1976) (excluding
department chairmen as supervisors), and University of Miami, 213 N.L.R.B. 634 (1974) (excluding deans as supervisors), with
Northeastern University, 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975) (department chairmen included within bargaining unit because they act
primarily as instruments of the faculty), and Fordham University, 193 N.L.R.B. 134 (1971) (including department chairmen
because they are considered to be representatives of the faculty rather than of the administration). In fact, the bargaining unit
approved by the Board in the present case excluded deans, acting deans, directors, and principal investigators of research and
training grants, all of whom were deemed to exercise supervisory or managerial authority. See ante, at 870, n. 7.

11

Nor does the frequency with which an employer acquiesces in the recommendations of its employees convert them into managers
or supervisors. See Stop & Shop Cos., Inc. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 17, 19 (CA1 1977). Rather, the pertinent inquiries are who retains
the ultimate decisionmaking authority and in whose interest the suggestions are offered. A different test could permit an employer
to deny its employees the benefits of collective bargaining on important issues of wages, hours, and other conditions of
employment merely by consulting with them on a host of less significant matters and accepting their advice when it is consistent
with management’s own objectives.

12

See, e. g., App. 740–742 (faculty hiring); id., at 232–233, 632, 667 (tenure); id., at 194, 620, 742–743 (promotion); id., at 713,
1463–1464 (retirement); id., at 241 (dismissal); id., at 362 (academic credits); id., at 723–724, 1469–1470 (cutback in departmental
budget leading to loss of accreditation); id., at 410, 726–727 (election of department chairman and representative).

13

See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).

14

See generally J. Brubacher & W. Rudy, Higher Education in Transition: A History of American Colleges and Universities,
1636–1976 (3d ed. 1976). In one of its earliest decisions in this area, the Board recognized that the governance structure of the
typical modern university does not fit the mold of true collegiality in which authority rests with a peer group of scholars. Adelphi
University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 (1972). Accord, New York University, 205 N.L.R.B. 4, 5 (1973). Even the concept of “shared
authority,” in which university decisionmaking is seen as the joint responsibility of both faculty and administration, with each
exerting a dominant influence in its respective sphere of expertise, has been found to be “an ideal rather than a widely adopted
practice.” K. Mortimer & T. McConnell, Sharing Authority Effectively 4 (1978). The authors conclude:
“Higher education is in the throes of a shift from informal and consensual judgments to authority based on formal criteria. . . .
There have been changes in societal and legislative expectations about higher education, an increase in external regulation of
colleges and universities, an increase in emphasis on managerial skills and the technocratic features of modern management, and
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a greater codification of internal decisionmaking procedures. These changes raise the question whether existing statements of
shared authority provide adequate guidelines for internal governance.” Id., at 269.

15

In 1976–1977, the total expenditures of institutions of higher education in the United States exceeded $42 billion. National Center
for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics 137 (Table 133) (1979). In the same year, Yeshiva University, a private
institution, received over $34 million in revenues from the Federal Government. Id., at 132 (Table 127).

16

University faculty members have been particularly hard hit by the current financial squeeze. Because of inflation, the purchasing
power of the faculty’s salary has declined an average of 2.9% every year since 1972. Real salaries are thus 13.6% below the 1972
levels. Hansen, An Era of Continuing Decline: Annual Report on the Economic Status of the Profession, 1978–1979, 65 Academe:
Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors 319, 323–324 (1979). Moreover, the faculty at Yeshiva has fared
even worse than most. Whereas the average salary of a full professor at a comparable institution is $31,100, a full professor at
Yeshiva averages only $27,100. Id., at 334, 348. In fact, a severe financial crisis at the University in 1971–1972 forced the
president to order a freeze on all faculty promotions and pay increases. App. 1459.

17

As of January 1979, 80 private and 302 public institutions of higher education had engaged in collective bargaining with their
faculties, and over 130,000 academic personnel had been unionized. National Center for the Study of Collective Bargaining in
Higher Education, Directory of Faculty Contracts and Bargaining Agents in Institutions of Higher Education i–ii (1979). Although
the NLRA is not applicable to any public employer, see 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), as of 1976, 22 States had enacted legislation granting
faculties at public institutions the right to unionize and requiring public employers to bargain with duly constituted bargaining
agents. Mortimer & McConnell, supra, n. 14, at 53. See also Livingston & Christensen, State and Federal Regulation of Collective
Negotiations in Higher Education, 1971 Wis.L.Rev. 91, 102.
The upsurge in the incidence of collective bargaining has generally been attributed to the faculty’s desire to use the process as a
countervailing force against increased administrative power and to ensure that the ideals of the academic community are actually
practiced. As the Carnegie Commission found, “[u]nionization for [faculty] is more a protective than an aggressive act, more an
effort to preserve the status quo than to achieve a new position of influence and affluence. . . .” Carnegie Commission on Higher
Education, Governance of Higher Education 40 (1973). See also Mortimer & McConnell, supra, n. 14, at 56; Lindeman, The
Five Most Cited Reasons for Faculty Unionization, 102 Intellect 85 (1973); Nielsen & Polishook, Collective Bargaining and
Beyond, The Chronicle of Higher Education 7 (May 21, 1979).

18

The Carnegie Commission, in concluding that “faculty members should have the right to organize and to bargain collectively, if
they so desire,” Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, supra, at 43, observed: “We may be involved in a long-term period of
greater social conflict in society and greater tension on campus. If so, it may be better to institutionalize this conflict through
collective bargaining than to have it manifest itself with less restraint. Collective bargaining does provide agreed-upon rules of
behavior, contractual understandings, and mechanisms for dispute settlement and grievance handling that help to manage conflict.”
Id., at 51.

19

Contrary to the Court’s assertion, see ante, at 863, the Board has not abandoned the “collective authority” and “ultimate authority”
branches of its analysis. See Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 78–857, pp. 11–12, n. 8. Although the “interest/alignment analysis”
rationale goes to the heart of the basis for the managerial and supervisory exclusions and therefore provides the strongest support
for the Board’s determination, the other two rationales are significant because they highlight two aspects of the university
decisionmaking process relevant to the Board’s decision: That the faculty’s influence is exercised collectively—and only
collectively—indicates that the faculty’s recommendations embody the views of the rank and file rather than those of a select
group of persons charged with formulating and implementing management policies. Similarly, that the administration retains
ultimate authority merely indicates that a true system of collegiality is simply not the mode of governance at Yeshiva University.
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